## MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE

## **CREDIT OPINION**

19 April 2018

## Update

Rate this Research >>

## RATINGS

De volksi	Darik IN.V.	
Domicile		Netherlands
Long Term	Debt	A3
Туре		Senior Unsecured - Fgn Curr
Outlook		Stable
Long Term	Deposit	A3
Туре		LT Bank Deposits - Fgn Curr
Outlook		Stable

Please see the <u>ratings section</u> at the end of this report for more information. The ratings and outlook shown reflect information as of the publication date.

#### Contacts

Laurent Le Mouel VP-Senior Analyst laurent.lemouel@moodys	+33.1.5330.3340 .com
Nick Hill <i>MD-Banking</i> nick.hill@moodys.com	+33.1.5330.1029
<b>Alain Laurin</b> Associate Managing Director	+33.1.5330.1059

## alain.laurin@moodys.com

#### CLIENT SERVICES

Americas	1-212-553-1653
Asia Pacific	852-3551-3077
Japan	81-3-5408-4100
EMEA	44-20-7772-5454

# De Volksbank N.V.


Update following rating upgrade

#### Summary

De Volksbank N.V.'s (De Volksbank) baseline credit assessment (BCA) of baa1 reflects its (1) very low risk profile; (2) strong capital base; and (3) resilient profitability, although constrained by its lack of diversification. As a result of (i) its strategic refocus on domestic retail mortgages and (ii) the benign macroeconomic environment prevailing in the Netherlands, De Volksbank's asset risk has improved materially over the past two years. In addition, the bank displays a very strong capital base allowing it to withstand the future accounting and regulatory requirements. Moreover , against a low interest rate environment, De Volksbank has shown a resilient profitability since 2014 owing to well-preserved interest margins, a significant decrease in credit costs and operating expenses. Despite these positive developments, the bank will continue to be constrained by its monoline business and lack of diversification.

De Volksbank's long-term deposit and senior unsecured debt ratings of A3 reflect (1) the bank's BCA of baa1; (2) no uplift from our Advanced Loss Given Failure (LGF) analysis due to the moderate loss-given-failure of these debt instruments; and (3) one notch of government support uplift due to De Volksbank's status of state-owned bank and systemic importance in the Netherlands.

#### Exhibit 1 Rating scorecard - Key financial ratios



Source: Moody's Financial Metrics

THIS REPORT WAS REPUBLISHED ON 23 MAY 2018 WITH AN UPDATED RATINGS TABLE ON PAGE 1.

#### **Credit strengths**

- » De Volksbank's asset book is primarily focused on the low-risk Dutch retail mortgages;
- » The bank has built a very strong capital buffer in preparation for the new regulatory and accounting rules;
- » The bank benefits from a sound liquidity profile, enhanced by its renewed access to market funding;
- » De Volksbank is a systemic institution in the Netherlands, benefiting from a moderate likelihood of government support in a stress scenario.

### Credit challenges

- » De Volksbank's profitability is challenged by the low interest rate environment and the highly competitive Dutch market;
- » The bank's risks and revenues are constrained by its monoline business and highly correlated with the Dutch mortgage market.

#### Rating outlook

The stable outlook on De Volksbank's long-term deposit and debt ratings reflects our expectation that the bank's asset risk will remain very low in the current benign macroeconomic environment, while the bank will keep a strong - although decreasing - capital buffer going forward. The low cost of risk and tight control over operating costs will continue to support the bank's profitability, and help withstand the pressure on interest income stemming from low interest rates.

### Factors that could lead to an upgrade

- » De Volksbank's BCA could be upgraded if its profitability and asset risk were to strengthen further. An upgrade of the bank's BCA would likely result in an upgrade of all ratings.
- » De Volksbank's deposit and senior unsecured debt ratings could also be upgraded if the volume of deposits collected by the bank were to further increase or if it were to issue larger than expected amounts of junior senior or subordinated debt, this second scenario resulting in a lower loss-given-failure for both depositors and senior debt holders.

### Factors that could lead to a downgrade

- » De Volksbank's BCA could be downgraded as a result of a material deterioration of the bank's asset quality and solvency driven by an unexpected downturn in the domestic economy, or a deterioration of its liquidity profile. A downgrade of the bank's BCA would likely lead to a downgrade of all ratings.
- » A material decrease in the amount of outstanding debt and deposits would also potentially lead to a downgrade of these instruments' ratings.

This publication does not announce a credit rating action. For any credit ratings referenced in this publication, please see the ratings tab on the issuer/entity page on www.moodys.com for the most updated credit rating action information and rating history.

## **Key indicators**

#### Exhibit 2

#### De Volksbank N.V. (Consolidated Financials) [1]

12-17 <sup>2</sup>	12-16 <sup>2</sup>	12-15 <sup>2</sup>	12-14 <sup>2</sup>	12-13 <sup>2</sup>	CAGR/Avg. <sup>3</sup>
60,186	60,599	61,422	66,513	73,416	-4.84
72,271	63,917	66,722	80,484	101,164	-8.14
3,560	3,366	3,118	2,580	2,266	12.04
4,275	3,550	3,387	3,122	3,122	8.24
1.4	1.8	3.1	4.3	4.5	3.0 <sup>5</sup>
36.4	31.1	27.1	18.7	15.0	25.7 <sup>6</sup>
18.4	24.4	44.3	74.5	89.2	50.2 <sup>5</sup>
1.5	1.5	1.6	1.5	1.3	1.5 <sup>5</sup>
4.2	3.4	4.0	3.6	3.6	3.7 <sup>6</sup>
0.5	0.6	0.6	0.2	-1.8	0.0 <sup>5</sup>
58.7	62.8	54.4	52.2	49.1	55.4 <sup>5</sup>
13.5	13.2	14.4	22.5	34.7	19.7 <sup>5</sup>
16.5	17.8	17.5	17.4	23.5	18.5 <sup>5</sup>
105.6	103.0	104.6	115.4	122.7	110.2 <sup>5</sup>
	60,186 72,271 3,560 4,275 1.4 36.4 18.4 1.5 4.2 0.5 58.7 13.5 16.5	60,186         60,599           72,271         63,917           3,560         3,366           4,275         3,550           1.4         1.8           36.4         31.1           18.4         24.4           1.5         1.5           4.2         3.4           0.5         0.6           58.7         62.8           13.5         13.2           16.5         17.8	60,18660,59961,42272,27163,91766,7223,5603,3663,1184,2753,5503,3871.41.83.136.431.127.118.424.444.31.51.51.64.23.44.00.50.60.658.762.854.413.513.214.416.517.817.5	60,18660,59961,42266,51372,27163,91766,72280,4843,5603,3663,1182,5804,2753,5503,3873,1221.41.83.14.336.431.127.118.718.424.444.374.51.51.51.61.54.23.44.03.60.50.60.60.258.762.854.452.213.513.214.422.516.517.817.517.4	60,18660,59961,42266,51373,41672,27163,91766,72280,484101,1643,5603,3663,1182,5802,2664,2753,5503,3873,1223,1221.41.83.14.34.536.431.127.118.715.018.424.444.374.589.21.51.51.61.51.34.23.44.03.63.60.50.60.60.2-1.858.762.854.452.249.113.513.214.422.534.716.517.817.517.423.5

[1] All figures and ratios are adjusted using Moody's standard adjustments [2] Basel III - fully-loaded or transitional phase-in; IFRS [3] May include rounding differences due to scale of reported amounts [4] Compound Annual Growth Rate (%) based on time period presented for the latest accounting regime [5] Simple average of periods presented for the latest accounting regime. [6] Simple average of Basel III periods presented Source: Moody's Financial Metrics

Source. Moody STilland

#### Profile

De Volksbank (formerly SNS Bank NV) is the fourth-largest retail bank in the Netherlands. As of December 2017, De Volksbank reported €61 billion in consolidated assets, a deposit base of €47 billion and a loan book of €49 billion. De Volksbank provides a range of retail banking and insurance products and services, including mortgages (75% of its total assets), current accounts, savings accounts and investment products. The bank mainly services individual retail customers and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the Netherlands.

Following large losses in its commercial real estate (CRE) lending portfolio, the former SNS Group (SNS REAAL) was nationalized on 1 February 2013 and subjected to an in-depth restructuring. In July 2016, the Dutch state agency NL Financial Investments (NLFI), the owner of De Volksbank, submitted a report to the Dutch Ministry of Finance advising it to postpone any decisions regarding the transfer of the bank's shares back to the private sector. The report suggests that a decision should not be taken before the bank's new business strategy has been fully implemented. The Ministry of Finance endorsed NLFI's conclusions in a letter on the future of the bank sent to the House of Representatives.

On 31 December 2016, ASN Bank NV, RegioBank NV and SNS Bank NV were legally merged, the separate banking licenses of ASN Bank NV and RegioBank NV were subsequently lapsed and the bank was renamed De Volksbank on 1 January 2017.

Please click here for further information on De Volksbank.

#### **Detailed credit considerations**

The financial data in the following sections are sourced from De Volksbank's financial statements, unless otherwise stated.

#### De Volksbank's asset book is primarily focused on the low-risk Dutch retail mortgages

De Volksbank's business strategy is focused on retail mortgages in the Netherlands, which amounted to 93% of its loan book, in 2017 (5% are loans to SMEs and 2% loans to the public sector). As a consequence of (1) improving macroeconomic conditions in the Netherlands and (2) stricter lending standards, driven by the Dutch government's measures on the tax deductibility of home loan interests and maximum loan-to-value (LTV) ratios, De Volksbank's asset risk profile has materially decreased since 2012. In 2017, the bank's NPL ratio stood at 1.4%, a decrease from 7.6% in 2012, and its credit cost has been negative over the last two years as a result of low provisioning and reversals of existing provisions.

De Volksbank's mortgage loan book is sound, despite risks identified in the Dutch housing market:

- » It is spread across all Dutch provinces and is not concentrated on large cities where house prices have increased most and overheating risks are more acute (about half of the bank's mortgage portfolio is located in rural or suburban areas, where house prices have increased by less than 6% in 2017);
- » The proportion of interest-only and investment-based loans, which are more prone to repayment risks, is decreasing and its high level (about 56% of outstanding loans) is in line with Dutch bank average (55%, according to the Dutch central bank);
- » The average LTV on outstanding loans is constantly decreasing (to 74% in 2017, from 80% in 2016) as a result of the house price increase and the Dutch government's measures to lower the LTV at origination to 100% in 2018;
- » 30% of De Volksbank's mortgage loans benefit from a guarantee of the Dutch Mortgage Guarantee (NHG)<sup>1</sup>;
- » An increasing share (79% in 2017) of De Volksbank's mortgage loans bear a fixed interest rate for a minimum period of 10 years (after which, the interest rate can be reset or float), preserving borrowers from an interest rate upsurge.

De Volksbank's loan book outside retail mortgages is very limited in size (€3.5 billion in December 2017) and its average credit cost stands at a very low level (a net positive 32 bps of gross loans in 2017). The bank also holds a financial investment portfolio for liquidity purposes, amounting to €4.9 billion as of December 2017. It is comprised of governments bonds (€3.5 billion), corporate bonds (€0.8 billion) and green bonds (€0.5 billion), rated in the AAA-AA range (94% of the portfolio).

De Volksbank's low risk profile is reflected in its a2 Asset Risk score.

#### The bank has built a very strong capital buffer in preparation for the new regulatory and accounting rules

De Volksbank is very well capitalized; its tangible common equity (TCE) amounted to 36.4% of its risk-weighted assets (RWA) as of December 2017. The bank's fully-loaded Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio stood at 34.3% as of the same date, well above its requirement of 9.625% in 2018 (consisting of a Pillar 1 requirement of 4.5%, a capital conservation buffer of 1.875%, a systemic buffer of 0.75% and a Pillar 2 requirement of 2.5%). The bank's capital ratio has increased substantially since 2014 as a result of (1) retained earnings, and (2) a decrease in RWA, driven by lower probabilities of default and loss-given-default as a result of improved economic conditions. As of December 2017, De Volksbank's leverage ratio stood at 5.6%, in line with that of most of its peers.

De Volksbank estimates that the finalization of the Basel III rules, published by the Basel Committee on 7 December 2017, would increase its RWAs by 35% and would negatively impact its CET1 ratio by 8 percentage points. However, the most impactful measure is the output floor, which will be phased-in until 2027, leaving the bank sufficient time to absorb this RWA increase, considering its currently large capital buffer. In addition, the IFRS 9 rules also have an estimated negative impact of 2 percentage points on De Volksbank CET1 ratio, mostly stemming from the re-classification of held-for-trading and available-for-sale assets to hold-to-collect.

As a result of regulatory and accounting changes, De Volksbank's CET1 ratio could drop to 24%. The bank's current CET1 capital buffer leaves it sufficient headroom to absorb this shock, though. The bank's CET1 ratio will remain well above its internal target of at least 15% (corresponding to a fully loaded requirement of 10.5% and a Pillar 2 guidance and management buffer of 4.5%). De Volksbank proposes to pay a €190 million dividend from its 2017 profits to its sole shareholder, NLFI, which corresponds to a payout ratio of 60%, at the higher range of its 40-60% pay-out target. We expect the bank's regulatory capital to decrease to a level closer to its 15% target, which would still be sufficient to fulfil its future estimated MREL requirement (of 19.75% of RWAs). Indeed, De Volksbank announced that it would issue up to €2 billion of junior senior debt (about 20% of RWAs), which would support the building-up of its MREL buffer (see Exhibit 3).

#### Exhibit 3

#### De Volksbank's announced €2 billion junior senior debt to be issued will be sufficient to fulfil its MREL requirement

20.00% MCC (market confidence MREL gap, 3.22% 18.00% charge), 2.25% 16.00% Tier 2 capital, 1.53% RA (recapitalization amount). 14.00% 7 00% 12 00% 10.00% 8.00% Total CET1 target, 15.00% 6.00% LAA (loss absorption amount), 10.50% 4.00% 2.00% 0.00% **MREL Requirement** MREL Ratio

■LAA (loss absorption amount) ■RA (recapitalization amount) ■MCC (market confidence charge) ■Total CET1 target ■Tier 2 capital ■MREL gap

Source: Single Resolution Board, De Volksbank Annual Report 2017, Moody's calculation


The bank's internal target of 15% CET1 ratio translates in a aa3 score, adjusted downwards by two-notches from the bank's macroadjusted score of aa1, which corresponds to a 36.4% TCE ratio.

#### De Volksbank's profitability is challenged by the low interest rates and a highly competitive environment

The profitability of De Volksbank's core retail activities is constrained by the challenging low interest rate environment and the bank's modest commercial franchise, compared with Dutch peers (net interest income amounts to 90% of its total income). The bank reported a  $\in$ 329 million net profit for the full-year 2017, a 6% decrease from the year earlier ( $\notin$ 349 million) owing to a lower net release of loan loss provisions. Net interest income and fees and commissions also decreased (by 1.5% and 14% respectively) due to (1) a high number of loan renewals at a lower rate and (2) lower securities fees following the sale of SNS Securities in 2016 ( $\notin$ 4 million) and the re-classification of distribution fees paid by Regiobank, which were previously classified as interest expenses ( $\notin$ 7 million).

The bank's cost-to-income ratio improved in 2017 to 59% from 63% in 2016, owing to lower operating expenses. A key challenge for De Volksbank is to preserve its profitability by attracting new clients and to improve its cost-efficiency. We consider the bank to be well positioned to achieve its targets because of the following factors:

- » De Volksbank's loan portfolio has been picking up again since year-end 2016, chiefly because of the bank's efforts to redefine its commercial offering and pricing policies (see Exhibit 4);
- » Over the last year, De Volksbank has reduced its deposit rates to preserve margins: De Volksbank's net interest margin now compares with that of its Dutch peers and we estimate that the bank still has room to further reduce deposit rates;
- » De Volksbank should continue to benefit from the positive prospects for the Dutch mortgage market in the coming years (rising house prices and low unemployment will continue to benefit to the bank's credit cost).



#### Exhibit 4 De Volksbank's loan portfolio started to pick-up again in 2017

Source: De Volksbank, Annual reports

The bank's challenged profitability is reflected in its baa3 score, one notch below the raw score of baa2, resulting from its three-year average return-on-assets of 0.5%.

#### De Volksbank benefits from a sound funding and liquidity profile, enhanced by renewed access to market funding

De Volksbank's funding primarily stems from its large deposit base, which amounted to  $\leq$ 46.9 billion ( $\leq$ 37.6 billion in retail savings and  $\leq$ 10.3 billion in other deposits) in December 2017, bringing its gross loan-to-deposit ratio to 107%. The 'other deposit' category is comprised of demand deposits ( $\leq$ 5.9 billion), savings associated with a mortgage ( $\leq$ 2.5 billion) and debt instruments issued by pension funds, insurance companies or De Volksbank's covered bond vehicle ( $\leq$ 1 billion), which are partly considered wholesale funding.

On 29 October 2015, De Volksbank issued a €500 million 10-year Tier 2 bond and, in May 2017, it publicly issued a €0.5 billion covered bond with a 10-year maturity. De Volksbank has also announced that it intends to issue around €2 billion in junior senior debt in the next years. These developments are credit positive and demonstrate that De Volksbank's liquidity profile is no longer constrained, as the bank can now fully access capital markets.

De Volksbank's liquidity profile supports its overall standalone credit profile, primarily as a result of its relatively large liquidity buffer, which should enable it to resist a prolonged period of financial market disruption. De Volksbank's liquid assets amounted to  $\leq 10.6$  billion as of December 2017, while its wholesale funding, maturing by the end of 2018, stood at  $\leq 3.4$  billion. The bank's liquidity buffer mainly consists of cash ( $\leq 3.8$  billion), sovereign and public-sector bonds ( $\leq 2.5$  billion), as well as residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) eligible for central bank refinancing ( $\leq 4.8$  billion). Although these assets are eligible for the European Central Bank (ECB) operations, we consider them to be of lower quality than central bank deposits or government bonds because they may not be negotiable in the secondary market in a stress situation.

The bank's strong liquidity and funding profiles are confirmed by its liquidity coverage ratio of 177% as of December 2017, and its NSFR above 100% at the same date. They are reflected in the bank's baa1 Combined Liquidity score.

De Volksbank's BCA of baa1 reflects its financial profile of a3, which is adjusted downwards by one notch to reflect the bank's excessive sensitivity to the Dutch retail mortgage market.

### Support and structural considerations

#### Loss Given Failure (LGF) analysis

De Volksbank is subject to the EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, which we consider to be an operational resolution regime. We assume residual TCE of 3%, losses post-failure of 8% of tangible banking assets, a 25% run-off in junior wholesale deposits, a 5% run-off in preferred deposits and a 25% probability to deposits being preferred to senior unsecured debt. Because De Volksbank's deposits are mainly retail in nature, we assume 90% of them will be preferred i.e protected by the deposit insurance mechanism (and 10% being junior) in an event of failure.

- » Our LGF analysis indicates a moderate loss-given-failure for deposits and senior unsecured debt, which translates into no uplift above the bank's Adjusted BCA;
- » Our LGF analysis indicates a high loss-given-failure for subordinated debt, leading us to make a negative adjustment of one notch below the bank's Adjusted BCA.

#### **Government support considerations**

The central bank of the Netherlands considers De Volksbank as a domestic systemically important institution. We thus believe that there is a moderate probability of government support for junior deposits and senior unsecured debt, resulting in a one-notch uplift from the bank's BCA. For other junior securities, we assume a low government support probability, and, therefore, the ratings for these instruments do not include any related uplift.

#### Counterparty Risk (CR) Assessment

CR Assessments are opinions of how counterparty obligations are likely to be treated if a bank fails and are distinct from debt and deposit ratings in that they (1) consider only the risk of default rather than both the likelihood of default and the expected financial loss suffered in the event of default, and (2) apply to counterparty obligations and contractual commitments rather than debt or deposit instruments. The CR assessment is an opinion of the counterparty risk related to a bank's covered bonds, contractual performance obligations (servicing), derivatives (e.g., swaps), letters of credit, guarantees and liquidity facilities.

#### De Volksbank's CR Assessment is positioned at Aa3(cr)/Prime-1(cr)

The CR Assessment includes three notches of uplift from the bank's BCA of baa1, based on the buffer against default provided by subordinated instruments and, in line with our support assumptions on deposits and senior unsecured debt, one notch of government support to the senior obligations represented by the CR Assessment. The main difference with our Advanced LGF approach, used to determine instrument ratings, is that the CR Assessment captures the probability of default on certain senior obligations, rather than expected loss, therefore, we focus purely on subordination and take no account of the volume of the instrument class.

## Rating methodology and scorecard factors

## Exhibit 5

De Volksbank N.V.

Macro Factors	
---------------	--

Weighted Macro Profile	Strong +	100%	

Factor	Historic Ratio	Macro Adjusted Score	Credit Trend	Assigned Score	Key driver #1	Key driver #2
Solvency						
Asset Risk						
Problem Loans / Gross Loans	2.1%	a2	$\leftarrow \rightarrow$	a2	Quality of assets	
Capital						
TCE / RWA	36.4%	aa1	$\downarrow\downarrow\downarrow$	aa3	Risk-weighted capitalisation	
Profitability						
Net Income / Tangible Assets	0.5%	baa2	$\leftarrow \rightarrow$	baa3	Earnings quality	
Combined Solvency Score		al		a2		
Liquidity						
Funding Structure						
Market Funds / Tangible Banking Assets	13.5%	a2	$\downarrow$	a3	Deposit quality	
Liquid Resources						
Liquid Banking Assets / Tangible Banking Assets	16.5%	baa2	$\leftarrow \rightarrow$	baa2	Quality of liquid assets	
Combined Liquidity Score		a3		baa1	•	
Financial Profile				a3		
Business Diversification				-1		
Opacity and Complexity				0		
Corporate Behavior				0		
Total Qualitative Adjustments				-1		
Sovereign or Affiliate constraint:				Aaa		
Scorecard Calculated BCA range				a3-baa2		
Assigned BCA				baa1		
Affiliate Support notching				0		
Adjusted BCA				baa1		
Balance Sheet		in-sc (EUR m		% in-scope	at-failure (EUR million)	% at-failure

Balance Sheet	in-scope	% in-scope	at-failure	% at-failure
	(EUR million)	-	(EUR million)	
Other liabilities	11,473	19.1%	14,620	24.3%
Deposits	44,955	74.7%	41,808	69.5%
Preferred deposits	40,460	67.2%	38,437	63.9%
Junior Deposits	4,496	7.5%	3,372	5.6%
Senior unsecured bank debt	1,441	2.4%	1,441	2.4%
Dated subordinated bank debt	498	0.8%	498	0.8%
Equity	1,805	3.0%	1,805	3.0%
Total Tangible Banking Assets	60,172	100%	60,172	100%

Debt class	De Jure w	vaterfall	De Facto v	vaterfall	Not	ching	LGF	Assigned	Additiona	l Preliminary
	Instrument volume + c subordinatio	ordinatio	Instrument on volume + o subordination	ordination	De Jure	De Facto	Notching Guidance vs. Adjusted BCA	LGF notching	notching	Rating Assessment
Counterparty Risk Assessment	11.8%	11.8%	11.8%	11.8%	3	3	3	3	0	a1 (cr)
Deposits	11.8%	3.8%	11.8%	6.2%	0	1	0	0	0	baa1
Senior unsecured bank debt	11.8%	3.8%	6.2%	3.8%	0	-1	0	0	0	baa1
Dated subordinated bank debt	3.8%	3.0%	3.8%	3.0%	-1	-1	-1	-1	0	baa2

Instrument class	Loss Given	Additional	Preliminary Rating	Government	Local Currency	Foreign
	Failure notching	Notching	Assessment	Support notching	Rating	Currency Rating
Counterparty Risk Assessment	3	0	a1 (cr)	1	Aa3 (cr)	
Deposits	0	0	baa1	1	A3	A3
Senior unsecured bank debt	0	0	baa1	1	A3	A3
Dated subordinated bank debt	-1	0	baa2	0	Baa2	

Source: Moody's Financial Metrics

## Ratings

Exhibit 6	
Category	Moody's Rating
DE VOLKSBANK N.V.	
Outlook	Stable
Bank Deposits	A3/P-2
Baseline Credit Assessment	baa1
Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment	baa1
Counterparty Risk Assessment	Aa3(cr)/P-1(cr)
Senior Unsecured	A3
Subordinate -Dom Curr	Baa2
Commercial Paper -Dom Curr	P-2
Other Short Term -Dom Curr	(P)P-2
Source: Moody's Investors Service	

Source: Moody's Investors Service

## Endnotes

1 This guarantee is limited to mortgage loans for a maximum house price of €265,000 and thus benefits primarily to first-time buyers

© 2018 Moody's Corporation, Moody's Investors Service, Inc., Moody's Analytics, Inc. and/or their licensors and affiliates (collectively, "MOODY'S"). All rights reserved. CREDIT RATINGS ISSUED BY MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, INC. AND ITS RATINGS AFFILIATES ("MIS") ARE MOODY'S CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE RELATIVE FUTURE CREDIT RISK OF ENTITIES, CREDIT COMMITMENTS, OR DEBT OR DEBT-LIKE SECURITIES, AND MOODY'S PUBLICATIONS MAY INCLUDE MOODY'S CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE RELATIVE FUTURE CREDIT RISK OF ENTITIES, CREDIT COMMITMENTS, OR DEBT OR DEBT-LIKE SECURITIES. MOODY'S DEFINES CREDIT RISK AS THE RISK THAT AN ENTITY MAY NOT MEET ITS CONTRACTUAL, FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS AS THEY COME DUE AND ANY ESTIMATED FINANCIAL LOSS IN THE EVENT OF DEFAULT. CREDIT RATINGS DO NOT ADDRESS ANY OTHER RISK, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO: LIQUIDITY RISK, MARKET VALUE RISK, OR PRICE VOLATILITY. CREDIT RATINGS AND MOODY'S OPINIONS INCLUDED IN MOODY'S PUBLICATIONS ARE NOT STATEMENTS OF CURRENT OR HISTORICAL FACT. MOODY'S PUBLICATIONS MAY ALSO INCLUDE QUANTITATIVE MODEL-BASED ESTIMATES OF CREDIT RISK AND RELATED OPINIONS OR COMMENTARY PUBLISHED BY MOODY'S ANALYTICS, INC. CREDIT RATINGS AND MOODY'S PUBLICATIONS DO NOT CONSTITUTE OR PROVIDE INVESTMENT OR FINANCIAL ADVICE, AND CREDIT RATINGS AND MOODY'S PUBLICATIONS ARE NOT AND DO NOT PROVIDE RECOMMENDATIONS TO PURCHASE, SELL, OR HOLD PARTICULAR SECURITIES. NEITHER CREDIT RATINGS NOR MOODY'S PUBLICATIONS WITH THE EXPECTATION AND UNDERSTANDING THAT EACH INVESTOR WILL, WITH DUE CARE, MAKE ITS OWN STUDY AND EVALUATION OF EACH SECURITY THAT IS UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR PURCHASE, HOLDING, OR SALE.

MOODY'S CREDIT RATINGS AND MOODY'S PUBLICATIONS ARE NOT INTENDED FOR USE BY RETAIL INVESTORS AND IT WOULD BE RECKLESS AND INAPPROPRIATE FOR RETAIL INVESTORS TO USE MOODY'S CREDIT RATINGS OR MOODY'S PUBLICATIONS WHEN MAKING AN INVESTMENT DECISION. IF IN DOUBT YOU SHOULD CONTACT YOUR FINANCIAL OR OTHER PROFESSIONAL ADVISER. ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS PROTECTED BY LAW, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO, COPYRIGHT LAW, AND NONE OF SUCH INFORMATION MAY BE COPIED OR OTHERWISE REPRODUCED, REPACKAGED, FURTHER TRANSMITTED, TRANSFERRED, DISSEMINATED, REDISTRIBUTED OR RESOLD, OR STORED FOR SUBSEQUENT USE FOR ANY SUCH PURPOSE, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, IN ANY FORM OR MANNER OR BY ANY MEANS WHATSOEVER, BY ANY PERSON WITHOUT MOODY'S PRIOR WRITTEN CONSENT.

CREDIT RATINGS AND MOODY'S PUBLICATIONS ARE NOT INTENDED FOR USE BY ANY PERSON AS A BENCHMARK AS THAT TERM IS DEFINED FOR REGULATORY PURPOSES AND MUST NOT BE USED IN ANY WAY THAT COULD RESULT IN THEM BEING CONSIDERED A BENCHMARK.

All information contained herein is obtained by MOODY'S from sources believed by it to be accurate and reliable. Because of the possibility of human or mechanical error as well as other factors, however, all information contained herein is provided "AS IS" without warranty of any kind. MOODY'S adopts all necessary measures so that the information it uses in assigning a credit rating is of sufficient quality and from sources MOODY'S considers to be reliable including, when appropriate, independent third-party sources. However, MOODY'S is not an auditor and cannot in every instance independently verify or validate information received in the rating process or in preparing the Moody's publications.

To the extent permitted by law, MOODY'S and its directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, licensors and suppliers disclaim liability to any person or entity for any indirect, special, consequential, or incidental losses or damages whatsoever arising from or in connection with the information contained herein or the use of or inability to use any such information, even if MOODY'S or any of its directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, licensors or suppliers is advised in advance of the possibility of such losses or damages, including but not limited to: (a) any loss of present or prospective profits or (b) any loss or damage arising where the relevant financial instrument is not the subject of a particular credit rating assigned by MOODY'S.

To the extent permitted by law, MOODY'S and its directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, licensors and suppliers disclaim liability for any direct or compensatory losses or damages caused to any person or entity, including but not limited to by any negligence (but excluding fraud, willful misconduct or any other type of liability that, for the avoidance of doubt, by law cannot be excluded) on the part of, or any contingency within or beyond the control of, MOODY'S or any of its directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, licensors or suppliers, arising from or in connection with the information contained herein or the use of or inability to use any such information.

NO WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, AS TO THE ACCURACY, TIMELINESS, COMPLETENESS, MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE OF ANY SUCH RATING OR OTHER OPINION OR INFORMATION IS GIVEN OR MADE BY MOODY'S IN ANY FORM OR MANNER WHATSOEVER.

Moody's Investors Service, Inc., a wholly-owned credit rating agency subsidiary of Moody's Corporation ("MCO"), hereby discloses that most issuers of debt securities (including corporate and municipal bonds, debentures, notes and commercial paper) and preferred stock rated by Moody's Investors Service, Inc. have, prior to assignment of any rating, agreed to pay to Moody's Investors Service, Inc. for appraisal and rating services rendered by it fees ranging from \$1,500 to approximately \$2,500,000. MCO and MIS also maintain policies and procedures to address the independence of MIS's ratings and rating processes. Information regarding certain affiliations that may exist between directors of MCO and rated entities, and between entities who hold ratings from MIS and have also publicly reported to the SEC an ownership interest in MCO of more than 5%, is posted annually at <u>www.moodys.com</u> under the heading "Investor Relations — Corporate Governance — Director and Shareholder Affiliation Policy."

Additional terms for Australia only: Any publication into Australia of this document is pursuant to the Australian Financial Services License of MOODY'S affiliate, Moody's Investors Service Pty Limited ABN 61 003 399 657AFSL 336969 and/or Moody's Analytics Australia Pty Ltd ABN 94 105 136 972 AFSL 383569 (as applicable). This document is intended to be provided only to "wholesale clients" within the meaning of section 761G of the Corporations Act 2001. By continuing to access this document from within Australia, you represent to MOODY'S that you are, or are accessing the document as a representative of, a "wholesale client" and that neither you nor the entity you represent will directly or indirectly disseminate this document or its contents to "retail clients" within the meaning of section 761G of the Corporations Act 2001. MOODY'S credit rating is an opinion as to the creditworthiness of a debt obligation of the issuer, not on the equity securities of the issuer or any form of security that is available to retail investors. It would be reckless and inappropriate for retail investors to use MOODY'S credit ratings or publications when making an investment decision. If in doubt you should contact your financial or other professional adviser.

Additional terms for Japan only: Moody's Japan K.K. ("MJKK") is a wholly-owned credit rating agency subsidiary of Moody's Group Japan G.K., which is wholly-owned by Moody's Overseas Holdings Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of MCO. Moody's SF Japan K.K. ("MSFJ") is a wholly-owned credit rating agency subsidiary of MJKK. MSFJ is not a Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization ("NRSRO"). Therefore, credit ratings assigned by MSFJ are Non-NRSRO Credit Ratings. Non-NRSRO Credit Ratings are assigned by an entity that is not a NRSRO and, consequently, the rated obligation will not qualify for certain types of treatment under U.S. laws. MJKK and MSFJ are credit rating agencies registered with the Japan Financial Services Agency and their registration numbers are FSA Commissioner (Ratings) No. 2 and 3 respectively.

MJKK or MSFJ (as applicable) hereby disclose that most issuers of debt securities (including corporate and municipal bonds, debentures, notes and commercial paper) and preferred stock rated by MJKK or MSFJ (as applicable) have, prior to assignment of any rating, agreed to pay to MJKK or MSFJ (as applicable) for appraisal and rating services rendered by it fees ranging from JPY200,000 to approximately JPY350,000,000.

MJKK and MSFJ also maintain policies and procedures to address Japanese regulatory requirements.

REPORT NUMBER 1120121

#### Contacts

Laurent Le Mouel VP-Senior Analyst laurent.lemouel@moodys.com

# +33.1.5330.3340

Alain Laurin Associate Managing Director alain.laurin@moodys.com +33.1.5330.1059

nick.hill@moodys.com
Andreea Prodea

Nick Hill

MD-Banking

Associate Analyst andreea.prodea@moodys.com

#### **CLIENT SERVICES**

+33.1.5330.1029	Americas	1-212-553-1653
	Asia Pacific	852-3551-3077
+33.1.5330.1055	Japan	81-3-5408-4100
	EMEA	44-20-7772-5454

## MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE